“What is history?
An echo of the past in the future, a shadow of the future on the past.”
Victor Hugo: The Man Who Laughs (1869)
Regarding the future, we come to the ultimate question of
our time: Is there going to be one? If the soul of the future is in the stories
we tell, what do those stories say about that?
Before there could be stories about the future, there had to
be a sense that there was something that would be different called the
future. The industrial revolution gave
western civilization a consciousness of change, both extensive and rapid. If the present is different from the past,
the future is likely to be different from the present. The question then was: What will that future
be?
H.G. Wells applied Darwin’s logic of evolution to define our
sense of the future as change governed by discernible forces, by
processes. So there was a way to
imagine a future, and tell stories about what the future might be (or could be,
or should be), and that way was rooted in what leads to that future. If you remember the future, you’d best
anticipate the past.
But then came the question that exploded in 1945, and
shrouded the 1950s and beyond: will there even be a future? The fact of nuclear weapons powerful enough
to destroy civilization led to both attempts to predict outcomes of nuclear war
(those Herman Kahn megadeath scenarios), and stories about how war could happen
and what the consequences would look like in various futures.
Now those questions confront us again, regarding the slow
motion nuclear war we blithely call climate change or global warming, the
climate crisis or increasingly now, the climate emergency. And so we are telling stories about that.
Some previous posts in this series were devoted to
describing a kind of progression of atomic apocalypse stories. At first—even before the first atomic bomb
exploded-- there were first a variety of print stories, mostly in science
fiction magazines, for a self-selected but limited readership. A few post-apocalyptic tales briefly became
best-sellers in the early 1950s.
Then in the mid-1950s there were the atomic monster movies like Gojira/Godzilla
and Them! The earliest and best
of them released suppressed fears in somewhat symbolic, mythical form. Then there were metaphoric variations: the invasion from
space substituting for a nuclear attack, the subversion or monster from within
expressing a range of related fears.
Political satire entered with Doctor Strangelove, and other
stories highlighting the absurdities required to start nuclear war, such as the
1983 WarGames with Mathew Broderick and Ally Sheedy.
Then there were
straightforward confrontations with the reality of nuclear war itself: quietly
at first, with
On the Beach (1959) and
Fail Safe (1964), and
finally with specific horror in Peter Watkins’
The War Game (1966),
Testament
(1983),
Threads (1984), and the television movie that reached a huge
U.S. audience,
The Day After (1983).
The Day After
Tomorrow
On the subject of the slow nuclear war of the climate crisis
and climate calamity, there is perhaps more of a jumble, but a similar pattern.
A variety of climate fiction print stories substantial enough to earn the genre
name of “cli-fi” reach a self-selected by so far limited readership (though Richard Power's Pulitzer winner, The Overstory, is sometimes classified among them.)
Movies and television stories mostly have
used climate and environment generally as a remote cause for apocalypse or
dystopia, substituting it for nuclear Armageddon, though some popular stories
(for instance, The Road) at best only imply a cause.
There’s a symbolic dimension in substituting climate change
for the usual nuclear explosion that revives monsters, as in the 2021 streaming
series
The Tomorrow War, or swapping humanity’s threat to the natural
world as the chief indictment made by powerful aliens, as in the 2008 remake of the previously nuclear war-themed
The Day The Earth Stood Still, or a couple of Marvel’s Avengers
movies. The animated
Wall-E may
function as the satirical
Dr. Strangelove environmental equivalent,
though deceptively gentler.
Instead of environmental causes, some dystopias (notably The Hunger Games) tend to concentrate on the
same social divisions that inspired the future of the Eloi and the Morlock in
Wells’ The Time Machine future: the powerful and rich few and the many
oppressed and poor. Occasionally the
connection is made that these riches are usually accumulated by destructively
exploiting the planet.
This division is also inherent in the genre that is perhaps
closest to the 1950s atomic monster movies in their pop symbolism: the vampire
and zombie stories. Vampires are the upper class exploiters (he was
Count
Dracula, after all), sucking the blood of the faceless masses as well as the
natural world. The zombies are the
embodiment of the faceless and mindless masses, maddened into swarming and destroying. Though zombies may also symbolize the
breakdown of civilization that could result from pandemics and environmental
catastrophes, vampires more cynically exploit the veneer of civilization to
mask their savagery. As such, these
stories can be seen as critiques and satires of this exploiting civilization,
as can such stories as
The Hunger Games.
In the atomic movie
age, symbolism and satire were followed by more realistic stories. As of this
moment, the one hit movie with some claim to a realistic approach to the
climate crisis was Roland Emmerich’s 2004
The Day After Tomorrow. Though it sacrificed scientific credibility
to enhance its dramatic story, it at least mentioned causes for a climate
shift, and depicted some predicted effects, particularly in early scenes before
the main action. The ice sheet breaking, the hail storm, the tornadoes caused
in part by climate changes are among the effects that have since happened in
the actual world.
So we do not yet have the climate equivalent of The Day
After or Testament—not even an On The Beach. We don’t yet have a cause-and-effect
apocalyptic story about climate. But
oddly, what we do have are climate crisis utopian stories told in realistic
terms, set in the near future.
After The Warming
Despite the scornful cliches, utopian stories never
pretended to depict a perfect society—just a better one. But in other ways, utopia as a story form has changed over
time. In the early 20th century, H.G. Wells introduced three
variations: the “kinetic” utopia, or the utopian community built to keep on
changing and getting better, the utopia that was spread over an entire planet
instead of only a single isolated place, and the utopia set in the future.
In his keynote address at the “Utopian Dreaming Conference”
in 2015 at the University of California Santa Cruz, author Kim Stanley Robinson
added another key ingredient. It was no
longer enough to describe a utopian society—this was just an exercise in
modeling (he included his Mars trilogy of novels in this type of utopian
story.) A utopian story for our age has
to describe the ways and means to get to that utopia, from this moment forward.
Using these criteria, it turns out there have been several such utopian stories focused on addressing the
climate crisis. In the midst of some
very hot summers, especially in the eastern US, Bill McKibben’s The End of
Nature and several other books of warning more or less inaugurated the era
of climate crisis concern in 1989. A
climate crisis utopian story emerged that same year, in an unusual form: a two
hour television program by James Burke called After the Warming.
Beginning in the 1970s, Burke wrote and hosted many
imaginative hours of television on science and technology in their historical
and social contexts, such as The Day The Universe Changed and the
various Connections series. The
premise of After the Warming was a look back at global response to the
climate crisis from the future of the year 2050.
The first hour catalogued the decisive changes in the history
of life on Earth, including the development of the human species and human
civilization, largely caused by major changes in climate. It’s difficult not to notice that the
relatively benign and stable climate that supported the last thousand years of
western civilization had completely blinded our leaders, historians and other
explainers to climate’s role. But this hour is perhaps the most literal
enactment of: To remember the future, anticipate the past.
The second hour was a “retrospective” account of how human
civilization felt the effects of what was then called the greenhouse effect,
and how it then addressed the long-term crisis resulting from global
heating.
Wearing a simplified 2050 futuristic suit (which got the
fashion right so far—no tie), Burke spoke of carbon trading as a means of
limiting and then ending industrial processes that added greenhouse gases to
the atmosphere. There would be a United
Nations authority in charge of managing these efforts, as well as responses to
the ongoing effects of those greenhouse gases emitted in the past, called the
Planetary Management Authority. As
climate effects become more pronounced (droughts, food shortages, sea level
rise, huge refugee movement, border wars), the PMA even has a military
component.
The utopian aspect of this future is that human civilization
addresses each element of the ongoing effects while confronting the causes with
a wide range of measures, from green energy to some ingenuous inventions and a
return to old ways of cooling homes without high-powered air conditioning. There are more challenges ahead in this
2050, but the far future of runaway climate collapse and the resulting end of
human civilization are avoided.
Now that we are more than 30 years into this future envisioned
in 1989, we can see that the dimensions of the effects it predicts did not
happen as early as it stipulates, and neither has the size of the
response. Burke tried to inject some
political realism by projecting that the world wouldn’t take concerted action
through the UN until the year 2000—a delay of more than a decade, which may
have seemed so long a lapse as to qualify as cynical. But then, the realities of the climate crisis were not
immediately accepted in 1989, not even by all scientists in the relevant fields
(as Burke himself found in post-program discussions aired on PBS.)

Burke’s breezy, colloquial style at times oversimplifies
both problems and solutions, but this 1989 program correctly assumes particular
characteristics of the climate crisis that are different from other crises that
modern societies have faced. Some of
these characteristics would not be more generally understood for years, even by
those who advocated action.
First, there are profound time lags between causes and
effects, between the greenhouse gases spewed into the atmosphere, and the
effects on weather and longterm climate, including melting ice and sea level
rise, higher temperatures, droughts, fires, flooding, storms and heat waves of
greater proportion, and secondary effects like famine, water shortages, and
more disease spread by insects who live through warmer winters.
One ramification was immediately understood: if serious
effects were to be avoided, action had to be taken to reduce greenhouse gases
even before these effects were evident.
That was to a great extent something new.
Another ramification took longer to understand and accept:
time lag meant that even if action in the present effectively reduces
greenhouse gases, the near future will still suffer effects of past
emissions.
A second characteristic is related but not quite the same:
the importance of what became known as tipping points. A rise in global temperature past a certain
point could tip the climate into another state, that would likely last for a
very long time—potentially thousands of years.
Later science suggested a series of such tipping points:
polar ice cap melting that once past a certain point, won’t stop until
completed, with devastating consequences to the world’s coastlines. And probably
the most fateful tipping point of all: the point at which the oceans can no
longer sustain life.
Part of the rationale for tipping points involve a third
characteristic: feedback effects. For
example, melting ice and snow means there is less white surface to reflect
solar radiation, which leads to even faster melting of the ice and snow that’s
left.
Because of these characteristics as well as just because of
the nature of the natural world, scientists and policymakers had to face the
sheer complexity of the interactions that make climate. Everything from
deforestation and key species extinctions to the interactions of barely
understood phenomena like clouds and wind were involved.
But the “greenhouse summers” of the late 1980s came and
went, and throughout the 1990s, “global warming” was studied and discussed
but—despite several flurries of interest, including Al Gore’s book and film, An
Inconvenient Truth—the climate crisis seldom made it to the top of the news
and never high on the national or international agenda.
Then between 2004 and 2007, Kim Stanley Robinson published a
trilogy of novels that constituted another climate utopia. Known collectively as the “Science in the
Capitol” trilogy, their author later condensed them into one volume as a single
novel titled Green Earth, published in 2015.
Green Earth
This story is set in contemporary or perhaps an unspecified
near future Washington, with some differences in the public figures. It is
narrated chiefly by three characters: Anna Quibler, a scientist at the National
Science Foundation, and her husband Charlie, an environmental policy advisor to
California Senator Phil Chase, currently working on a climate bill from home
while taking care of their toddler son. Frank Vanderwal is a West Coast
scientist with an active interest in sociobiology and primatology (Robinson
named him after famed primatologist Frans de Waal) who is working for a year at
the NSF with Anna.
Anna gets interested in the monks opening an embassy in the
same building as NSF representing the (fictional) island nation of Tibetan
Buddhist exiles called Khembalung, which is threatened by rising sea
levels. Frank is upset that the
Foundation isn’t doing enough to confront the climate crisis, and writes an
angry letter to its director, Diana Chang.
These actions begin the chain of events and relationships that carry
through this richly textured novel.
The climate itself becomes a character in probably the
book’s most fabled sequence, when a superstorm crashes up the East Coast,
seriously flooding subways and streets in Washington. Robinson named it Tropical Storm Sandy. Eight years later in the real world of 2012, another perfect
storm, formed in a similar way, became Tropical Storm Sandy, and then Hurricane
or Superstorm Sandy that did extensive damage in 24 U.S. states and several
Caribbean islands, notably in substantially flooding subways and streets in New
York City.
At about the same time as the fictional Sandy hits the East
Coast, an enormous storm attacks the West Coast of a type that has also since
become a reality (a result of the “atmospheric river,” a phenomenon that didn’t
even have a name when this part of the novel was first published.) All of this is closely associated with
climate distortion, and adds impetus and urgency to concern and even action in
this fictional Washington.
Also a major climate element in the plot is the same
phenomenon fictionalized in the movie The Day After Tomorrow: the
slowing of the North Atlantic conveyor that results in periods of very cold
weather in Washington, among other places.
One of the first actions initiated by scientists is a massive effort to
add salt in key areas of the ocean to try to reverse the slowing.
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| KSR |
Though the climate plotline is not the only one in this
capacious story of more than 1000 pages, it is central. Eventually Senator Phil Chase is elected
President and begins both governmental change and persuasive focus on the
climate crisis, especially in a series of blog posts and conversations.
Though climate
tragedies continue to happen—including the complete inundation of
Khembalung—the idea of science guiding policy leads to a hopeful
conclusion. In fact, the novel winds up
being a comedy in the classic Shakespearian sense, because it ends like a climate
As You Like It: good people restoring the state, gathered in nature for
marriages (including one that is more than symbolically a marriage of science
and power)—blessed by none other than the Dalai Lama.
No sooner had the final volume of this utopian climate story
been published however, than real world prospects suddenly began to look so
alarming that attitudes among those thinking and writing about the climate
crisis shifted. The possibility of even
this utopia was slipping away.
A World of Falling
Skies
From around 2005, scientists—especially in Europe-- were
seeing the prospect of climate disruption coming much sooner than generally
predicted: not necessarily the abrupt climate shift that fascinated
storytellers but a worsening series of already known effects (floods, fires,
ice melts, heat waves, droughts, etc.) and possibly some unknown ones, that
were going to continue no matter what the world did to limit greenhouse gases.
At first there were debates about whether sounding the alarm
on coming effects would distract from addressing the causes of greater
catastrophe in the farther future.
There was worry about “alarmism” either damaging the credibility of
climate scientists and climate action advocates, or driving people into the
numbed inaction of despair.
But despite these fears, the writing about the climate
crisis began to darken a few years later, in 2009 or so, as scientific
observations—particularly of polar melting—were showing consequences not
predicted to happen for decades even in worst case scenarios. The rhetoric of “solving” the climate crisis
(in Al Gore’s words) quietly slipped away.
Instead, various writers attempted to constructively confront the
prospect of a darker future, hoping to prevent an even worse one, at least in
the farther future.
A particularly eloquent example was environmentalist David
Orr’s Down to the Wire (2009.) The evidence that global heating was
causing grave consequences, and due to time lag effects, would continue to do
so for the near future, became his guardedly accepted premise. “The news about
climate, oceans, species, and all of the collateral human consequences will get
a great deal worse for a long time before it gets betters,” he wrote. “The
reasons for authentic hope are on a farther horizon, centuries ahead...The
change in our perspective from the nearer to the longer term is, I think, the
most difficult challenge we will face.”
The early and persistent voice on climate belonged to writer
and activist Bill McKibben, and his 2010 book Eaarth acknowledged the
new prospects. His title was meant to
symbolize that the planet had already changed from the Earth we knew, and won’t
change back. The best we can do for the
near future is “manage our descent.”
Also in 2010, Paul Gildings The Great Disruption was
billed as an optimistic view because he believed that humanity will eventually
rise to the occasion, though only after we “tragically lose a few billion
people.”
Journalist Mark Hertsgaard, who got onto the time lag
consequences early, wrote about ongoing efforts to deal with the near and
farther future of the climate crisis in Hot: Living Through the Next Fifty
Years on Earth (2011.) (In a 2005
essay he called the two tracks “protection” and “prevention,” though in this
book he reverts to the conventional and confusing nomenclature of “adaptation”
and “mitgation.” I prefer to simply
call them causes and effects.)
Hertsgaard provides a practical mantra for planning along both tracks:
“Avoid the unmanageable, manage the unavoidable.”
In
Apocalyptic Planet (2012), another important work
of journalism and a book of deep eloquence, Craig Child visited places where
climate distortion consequences were tangible, and to extreme places where one
apocalypse or another already happened in the past.
A major figure in Childs' long
Greenland chapter is Koni Steffans, a European climate expert whose research
camp Childs is visiting. From time to
time, government officials and others visit the camp for updates, Steffans
said. “What he tells people who visit,”
Child writes,” is not that the sky is falling but that we live in a world of
falling skies, and it is best not only to know your options but to make moves
ensuring the worst does not happen.”
The long-term worst is a severely hotter world that lasts
for thousands of years, obliterating human civilization and most forms of life
as we know them now. But climate alone
is not the only path to that profound end.
The Sixth Extinction (2014) by science journalist Elizabeth
Kolbert details the increasing danger if not likelihood of the permanent death
of most forms of life, all in one way or another caused by what humans are
doing. Climate distortion is a major but not sole cause of the extinction of half the species now existing
on the planet, before this century is half over. A more optimistic estimate is one-fourth.
The element of extinctions emphasized another profound
aspect of the dilemma. Once it happens,
extinction is permanent. It is probably
impossible to reverse it for any species, let alone a significant number of
them. Then changes begin in the
ecosystem because of extinctions, and it is deformed in ways that humans can’t
fix.
The same is true of other effects that are very likely at
the end of the road we’re on. If the ocean dies—acidified and deprived of
oxygen—people can’t bring it back. If
the North Atlantic/Gulf Stream currents stop, there’s no do-over, no reset
button. The only solution is to
anticipate these effects and prevent them from happening. This requires imagining a future before it
arrives.
Kim Stanley Robinson wrote about one climate crisis future
or another several times after his Science in the Capital trilogy. But when he returned to a near-future
utopian tale centered on climate issues in 2020, he had a dramatically specific
definition for what constitutes a utopia today: a future that manages to avoid
a mass extinction event.
That’s it. That’s
all. But it looks so difficult to attain that it is utopian, in its several
senses (including the pejorative.) Which in several ways may qualify his
resulting novel, The Ministry for the Future, as the Last Utopia.
The Ministry for the
Future
“I happen in the present but am told only in the future,
and then they think they speak of the past, but really they are always speaking
about the present. I do not exist and
yet I am everything.
You know what I am.
I am History. Now make me good.”
KSR: The Ministry for the Future (2020)
Published in 2020,
The Ministry for the Future won
widespread praise and interest, notably outside the science fiction
community. New York Times podcaster
Ezra Klein extolled it and interviewed the author. The book made several best or favorites of the year lists,
including that of former President Barack Obama, who played a key role in
creating the 2015 Paris Agreement, in which every nation on Earth acknowledged
the deadly seriousness of the climate crisis and pledged to confront it. In interviews publicizing the book, author
Robinson suggested this was such an unexpected watershed achievement as to qualify as science fiction.
By the summer of 2021, with its clusters of apocalyptic
climate disasters and the UN climate scientists’ dire now-or-never report,
Robinson’s very near future novel was already bumping up against reality. The paperback edition scheduled for fall
2021 had a new cover, featuring the face of an old style pocket watch, but with
no hands. The future is now.
In his keynote speech for the Utopia Dreaming conference in
2015, Kim Stanley Robinson provided the aforementioned criteria for a utopian
story today: it has to be global, and it has to not only describe the utopian
result, but how it was achieved. He
then described what a 2015 utopian tale might look like, with a lot of detail
about world finance that seemed to stun his audience into silence. But he centered his tale in the United
States, because it was the indispensable nation, the obvious superpower.
He had already set his Green Earth utopian novel in
Washington, and largely in the United States.
But in striking contrast, his 2020 near future utopia seldom even visits
the US and barely mentions its role, except as a reactionary government and a
problem. Confronting the climate crisis
is left to the rest of the world.
The Ministry of the Future begins in India, with a
climate catastrophe that is orders of magnitude greater and more horrific than
the storms in Green Earth. From
at least the time of H.G. Wells (including his film script for Things To
Come), utopian stories often begin with apocalypse. Often these are the result of wars, lately
nuclear wars. This novel depicts their
climate equivalent.
Part of what made the imagery of nuclear war so powerful was
the new element of radiation and its effects.
But many climate distortion effects are phenomena that might be awesome
and terrifying but also familiar, though perhaps not on the same scale: floods
and fires, storms and drought. But what
had not been much discussed prior to 2020 was the most obvious effect of global
heating: heat itself.

Summer heat waves
are even more familiar. Dangerous to
some (the old, the unsheltered poor), getting through them was a kind of game
to others. Some reveled in them, as
some people claim to love the hottest hot sauce they can find. Illnesses and deaths from heat were hard to
quantify, and the imagery of heat waves in the media was seldom scary: usually
people dousing themselves with water to cool off. At least before the summer of 2021, heat didn’t seem all that
dangerous. But global heating makes possible
and even likely the combination of temperature and humidity that human beings
simply can’t survive.
In just its first
twelve pages, this novel indelibly describes what an extreme killing heat event
might be like. In 2004, a superstorm
flooding a northeastern US city was a stretch, if not much of one. But this time, the event described here is
more like the opening scenes of the 1936 Things To Come, in which a
major city is shown bombed from the air a few years before such an attack
actually happened for the first time: it’s an eerie look at an all but
inevitable near future.
In this novel, such a heat wave covers a large area of
India. It is days and nights of the
combination of heat and humidity that exceeds the human body’s ability to
function. Though there are more precise
descriptions, basically people are cooked by the air. In this event, the heat affects machinery as well as organisms,
and very soon the power goes out, and with it the slim hope of air
conditioning. Old people, babies and
young children begin to die. In the one
town described, people stand in a lake, but in the sun the water is close to
the boiling point. Everyone there dies,
except one survivor.
Across this region of India, perhaps twenty million people
die from the heat. The government responds with anger and resolve. It begins with the controversial
geoengineering technique of scattering sulphur dioxide in the stratosphere to
block solar radiation, to cause slightly lower global temperatures for a few
years, much as the volcano Pinatubo did in 1991.
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| former President of Ireland is model for Mary Murphy |
The year before this
heat wave, responding to a general lack of compliance to the agreed promises, a
conference of the parties to the international Paris Agreements on climate sets
up a new organization to “advocate for the world’s future generations of
citizens” and to defend “all living creatures present and future who cannot
speak for themselves.” This
organization, headquartered in Zurich, Switzerland, is soon known as the
Ministry for the Future. It is headed by
Mary Murphy of Ireland.
Followers of fiction by Kim Stanley Robinson know of his
predilection for naming one of his main characters Frank. The author claims (perhaps with tongue in
cheek) that he gives the name to characters who are not always truthful. However, in his two climate-themed utopian
novels discussed here, his Frank character notably gets action going precisely
by being frank.
In Green Earth, scientist Frank Vanderwal writes a
scathing letter to his boss at the National Science Foundation claiming the NSF
isn’t doing enough to address climate change, which leads to action and a
forward momentum for the rest of the story.
In The Ministry for the Future, the character Frank May does
something similar, but the difference again reflects the new urgency. This time, Frank briefly but forcibly
kidnaps Mary Murphy to demand that the Ministry for the Future do more.
Frank Vanderwal became a somewhat damaged character in Green
Earth, but Frank May, an American who wanted to do good by running a
medical clinic where it was most needed, is deeply and permanently damaged in
the novel’s first pages—for he is the single survivor of the heat wave in that
town in India. He remains a character
for most of the book, but mostly as a quietly courageous friend to Mary, who is
never quite sure why she needs him.
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| Zurich |
The novel covers some 25 years, ending about where
After
the Warming ends: around mid 21
st century. The efforts to address climate and
extinction advocated and orchestrated by the Ministry are various--technological
(including the novel idea of sucking out the water underneath polar glaciers to
slow their sliding into the sea), economic and financial, and a number of other
ways that might be grouped as political.
Unlike Burke’s Planetary Management Authority, the Ministry for the
Future has no power to compel nations or even individuals to do or not do
anything—which is certainly more realistic for today’s world. How it is effective, in partnership with
highly placed government officials (notably in India and China) and—of all
people—major bankers, is this book’s utopian substance.
But there is also a darker side—groups like the Children of
Kali, who use targeted assassinations and other acts of violence, some of it in
cyberspace. Even the Ministry has a
“black wing.” Both the ethics and
effectiveness of such acts are debated, but remain as measures of the desperate
moment. That moment—this moment—is
neither exaggerated nor minimized, which is sobering in itself.
Through the “trembling twenties” and even after the Great
Turn in the 2030s there are more catastrophes along the way, including a flood
that destroys Los Angeles, and a couple of serious economic depressions. But the world starts to look better, with
more animals (including the Ghost Dance dream of the buffalo’s return) and
fewer people. The ruinous control of
most of the world’s wealth by a few is largely over: there is more equality and
broader sufficiency. Airships (high
tech dirigibles) replace jet planes, and on the oceans fossil fuel driven
vessels are replaced by the kind of high tech sailing ships that brings this
utopia more towards the one in KSR’s first utopian novel, Pacific Edge
(1990), which he wrote while living for a year or so in Zurich.

He uses a few narrative forms in short chapters (first
person accounts by unnamed characters never mentioned again, “Who I am?”
riddles like those presented in old school texts and children's magazines, and meeting notes and
transcripts) in addition to the main narrative that mostly follows Mary Murphy. Some of these interpolations are real
highlights. A chapter that is nothing
but the names of a number of grassroots permaculture organizations introducing themselves, while functioning as an economical way of suggesting the hundreds of activities that contribute to
making this better future, turns out to also be powerfully moving.
In figuring out ways that an extinction event could be
stopped and the future saved from the broadly fatal climate cataclysm, Robinson
ends up with a classic utopia: a greatly changed but better world, that
nevertheless saves the best of what’s still around. But it is neither perfect
nor permanent, especially as climate distortion effects continue, and some of
the environmental consequences (such as ocean acidification) are in a practical
sense permanent. But it is a kinetic
utopia—built to continue to respond and change.
The novel ends with
Mary Murphy, newly retired from the Ministry for the Future, and living in the
kind of housing co-op that Robinson made up in
Pacific Edge and now
actually lives in. She is in the company of a new flame, the less than dashing
pilot of one of those new airships, attending an event with centuries of
history and continuity: the Fasnact, Zurich’s version of Mardi Gras.
Elsewhere in this novel Robinson mentions the statue in
Zurich of 20th century writer of mythic fiction, James Joyce. In the original preface to his first
collection of stories, The Planet On The Table, he conducts a dialogue
with it, and the Joyce statue talks back.
Robinson concludes this novel with a circular Joycean flourish, in which
the end is also a beginning, in Mary’s testament of stubborn faith in the
future:
“We will keep going, she said to him in her head—to everyone she
knew or had ever known, all those people so tangled inside her, living or dead,
we will keep going, she reassured them all, but mostly herself, if she could;
we will keep going, we will keep going, because there is no such thing as
fate. Because we never really come to
the end.”
Next post in this
series: “Soul of the Future Concluded: The Culture of Hope.”